Tltis paper is an ottentpt to descibe several aspects of the epistentologies tlnt are used in the farnily discipline. It argues that phenonina suilt as the blnlt process and gerwotion.s ,ntake the "fantily reahn" uniEte in tlrc sante way econonic, psychic, social, and histoical plrcnontena are unique, and ttis has allowed sclrolars in the last four decades to begin developirtg i family discipline tlrut is as basic or pinury as the otlrcr social sciences-. The four-intetticnat traditiorts tlut have-b.een using these new epistemologies in snidying tlrc fanily are descibe4 and it is sugested that they have ionstructed'ntlore prt"rory explanations tlran _is gelerglly recognized. several uamples of their pinnry explanations are descibeQ and the paper concludes wiih some specitlatioris about fudre possibilities tlrc new epistemologies may make possibli.
When a new discipline emerges, there are new questions that are asked and new methodologies that are developedio try to answer the questions. In other words, there are new epistemologies. The lrst person to write extensively about these epistemological issues in ine fu-ry neld was Gregory Bateson (1972 Bateson ( ,1979 , and his ideas led to some spirited debates about the nature and value of an ecosystemic epistemology (Dell, 1"982; K"eoey & Dell, 1.982; Gurman, 1983; and Bogdan, 1937) . The intent o{ thig plper is to extend earlier attempts to identify the epistemologies used in lhe family field-and describe what seem to us to be several additional aspects of its epistemologies. These issues are extremely comple4 and our understanding of them is a gradually -evolving construction (Watzlawick, L984), so we are aware that this attempt to help describe these epistemologies is rudementary; and we welcome the additional dialogue that undoubtedly will occur.
THE BIRTH PROCESS CREATES A FAMILY "REALM'
A recent paper by Kingsley Davis helped us better understand the epistem-ologies that are used in the new family discipline. The paper included a description of Davis' unsuccessful attempt to find or create a family field in the 1930s, and his subsequent attempt to identify the intellectual bedrock upon which a family held could be created.
As a graduate student I set out to speciaiize in the study of marriage and the family. In due course I became dissatisfied with the relatively uns)atematic fteralures in the field; and long before Murdock, I sought to hnd a central criterion of relevance by which the whole field could be ordered. I felt, and still feel, that I found this criterion. It is the recognition a-nd use of conttectiott througlt birth as a basis of group structure and social organization. Marriage normally involves the connection of husband and wife through common offspring; the nuclear family is composed of parents and children; siblings arerelaied by having common parents; the wider kinship structure is built out of a nerwork of inierlocking nuclear families. Hence all marital and familial phenomena ultimately come back to connection through birth. Given this criterion of relevance, hypothetical propositions can be generated, mathematics can be applied, and a science of familogy can be developed. Furthermore, this science can link up closely with genetics, because genetics is the study of connection through reproductive cells. And it can link up with the social sciences, for these deal with other bases of connection which limit the consanguinity basis. (Davis, 1984, p 5. Italics added.) Thus, Davis argued that birtlt and the connections that are created tlrrouglt birtlt are sufficiently unique and influential that they can be the basis for the family field being a separate area of scholarly inquiry. This insight seems to us to identily at least one aspect of the epistemological foundations of the family field because it provides a basis for primary, familial explanations. This insight alone, however, as potentially profound and important as it may be or become, is only the beginning of an important line of reasoni:rg. By itself, it does not help us much until the ramfications it has and the issues and questions it raises are made explicit. One of these questions is: How can birth and the connections it creates be sufficiently unique that they can be, in Davis' words "a central criterion of relevance by which the whole field could be ordered?" This is one of several crucial questions on which we hope to shed light in this paper.
It seems to us that birth is an irreducible, essential, and universal phenomenon that is much more than a biological or social process. It inherently involves a number of complicated interpersonal, mental, emotional, temporal, genetic, spatial, hormonal generational, experiential, sexual, and developmental processes that are inextricably intertwined. For example, physiologically the mother experiences dramatic changes in hormones, discomfort, pain, and the shape of her body. the mouement inside hei own body of the person she is helping to create also creates a variety of changes. The necessary concern and care after birth involves and impacts many-individual-s. These processes of-conception, pregnancy, birth, and nurturing creale a unique set of connections that are mental, temporal, spatial, interpersonal, emotional, ge'nerational, experiential, and de-velopmental. In addilion, these ionnections involve sich things as plans, goals-, aspirations, deeply e4perienced affect, decision making, life cycle transitions, priorities, developmental tasks, boundaries, and the allocation of-iesources.
In.an earlier paper, !9ut!e1 er al., (1987) suggested that the complicated set of connections that are created by birth be labeled thefamity realn. This conceptualization broadens and deepens the definition of what we think fimily things are. Tiaditionally, the conceptualization of fanily has been that it is "a cultural u-oit *hi"h contains i husband and wife who are the mother and father of their child or children" (Schneider, 1980, p.33) . More recently many scholars have argued that "non-traditional" forms of the family also need to be included in a definition of family. The family realn concept goes even further by including more than just nuclear families and non-traditional forms. hne fgTity reatn includes married couples who do not have children, families with adopted children, stepfamilies, remarriages, and even single people living'alone because they all have parents-and. they. expe-rience part of their tife.in i "farnily reilm." Also most people, regardless of their uniq-ue {anily situation, have siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins, "t.., iod these are parts of the family realm. In addition, moJt people have familial memories, hopes, aspirations, heritage, expe-riences, ethics, process6s, development, rules, patterns, and bonds, and these are part of the family realrn.
-._Another way the family realn concept is different from traditional views of the family is that traditionally the "family" has-been viewed as nothing more than a social institution. Social institutions are structures, such as governdents, religions, and educational systerns, that are created by humans to aJcomplish certain-fu.r.iior,.. According to the family realm conceptuaiization, some parts of tle fu-ity r"ut-ute "institutionalized" but there.are some parts of.the family realm that are not socially determined. For example, the. family-realm is influenced by biological, environmentai and. nutritional phenomena in addition to cultural patierns. -Also, at its mosi fundamental level, there are familial phenomena that ari as basic and fundamental to the human species as the-biologi-cal and cultural phenomeua. For example, Rich (1976j has demonstrated that the family venlm 135 e:peiential dimensions thit are difierenl from the institutionalized patterns that are creited by cultures, and Bowen (197g) has discovered affective aspects of the family realn that aie not reduceabte to UiotogiJd oi cultural patterns. Also developmentalists such as Duvall (1955) trave idEntifiea (9v9loryngnta! processes that occur in the fqmily reakn that i." oror" than merely biological and cultural pro._cesses. Thus, two advantages of the family realm concept arl that.-it has_enough flexibility that it includes all of-the "non-traditional" forms of the family, and it includes phenomena that are as fundamental as the cultural, biological, historical, and technological factors that shape, mold, and influence the details-and appearance of family processes.
The family realm is unique l-n m_any ways. For example, it is the part of the human experience that has generational relationships. None of ine othei realms in which humans participate have the same type of generational relationships. It also tends to have a unique set of rules, ethics, stin-dards, priorities,.and processes (Fortes, 1969) . Also, the nature of aspirations, feelingsi frustrations, ^ temporal ' orientationl, achievements, interacting, bonding, -aoaging, choosing, secluding, healing, etc, ar-e Family Science Review r87 different than when these same processes occur outside the family realm. Beutler et al., (1"987) and Burr et al., (1988, ch 1) There are several ways a recogrition of the family real-makes a diflerence epistemologically. One way is that when scholars begin with a sensitiriw to the family reaLm, it creates a "familial" perspective, and this perspective leads these scholars to ask different Ercstiotls and create different erplanatiorts than scholars who have other perspectives. For example, when therapists such as Jacksoq Satir, and Bowen began to look for familial causes of the problems they were dealing with in their thcrapy they made an epistemological shift. They began looking in a different place for the problems and treatments. They began to think of problems and treatmena as being in familial systems in addition to individual systems. One way of describing t\i< epistemological shift is that they began punctuating (WatzJawick et al.,1967) their thinking differently by thinking about the role of familial phenomena" and Keeney has suggested that this was enough of a change that he called it an "alternative paradigm' (L979, p.117).
Another way of describing this epistemological shift is that the family-realm perspective appeals to familial factors as the explicans so tley are familogical rather than sociological, psychological, genetic, economic, chemical, or historical explanations. Even though some psychologists, such as Bogdan (1987) , propose that family therapy can be reduced to psychological explanations and some sociologists, such as Bardis (198a) and Sprey (1983) , have argued that the earlier perspectives are enough, we suggest that familogists have been developing profound and useful familial explarations that have nof been developed in the older fields.
A second effect the "family realm" perspective has had on epistemologies is that scholars who use this perspective tend to emphasize a slightly different set of. concepts in their explanations and interventions. The ioncepts tend to deal much more with ihe non-rational, affective, developmental, gender related, bonded, intergenerational life span, purposive, nurturing circular, altruistic, particularistic, goal-oriented, intimate, experiential, generative, dose interpersonal, resource, inefficient, aesthetig and cooperative parts of the human experience.
The influence of a family realm perspective on epistemologies is similar to some larger trends and issues in all of the sciences. For example, a family-realm point of view is incompatible in many ways with the traditional view of causality that has dominated scientific thought in the last several centuries. The traditional view has been that all sciences assume reality is governed by law-like, causal processes that operate in a mechanistic and linear way. Scholars such as Capra (L982) argue that many disciplines are moving away from the belief that this Cartesian perspective that is based on Newtonian physics is the only way to view realify. They argue that the natural and social sciences are moving toward a set of assumptions that is also sensitive to more holistic, ecosystemic, and interactive processes. The systemic ideas of Bateson (L972, 1979 ) that were such an important part of the emergence of the family-realm perspective have placed the study of families in the vanguard of this development in ihe social sciences, and the result is a search for a different fype of knowledge utilizing a unique perspective. At the present time many scholars are arguing that we need to choose befween the Carte si find it r"iew. Cartesian and ecosystemic perspectives, but we suspect that when the dust settles we will find it useful to again follow Bateson and adopt a-"both and" rather than an "either or,, uew.
_ There are many aspects to these epistemological shifts, and another one deals with determinism versus indeterminism. Deterministism assumes there are law-like causes that can be identihed. This is different from the indeterministic assumption that some things occur because of purposive or teleological processes. The home management (Paolucci, 1977) , family therapy (Hoffman, 1981) , and family life education parti of the field have focused on the purposive-parts of limily systems. This emphasis is fairly different from the more traditional perspectives we -have inherited fiom the oldei sciences.
._So99_uspects of the epistemologicgl shifts and debates are fairly unique ro the family field. For example, .a group of familogists have argued that we should use a circular rather than linear view of causation ir studying faiilies, and Hoffman (19g1j !99-_: to suggest th,at wg should only think with circular causation. Others, such ai Delt (1980)' argue.that-igno-ring linear causation in families would merely "r, in a different direction. A slightly. different approacn *u. sr rygested by Watzlawick et al., (1967) when they suggested that it is more productive to think about effects than causes.
'It seems to us that we need to recognize that linear and circular processes both occur in families, .an{ we ought to adopt epistemological approaches thaiallow us to get knowledge aboui both.
. Two other ways the emergence of a familogical perspective has influenced 9Pf^t.o-olgqes are that.familogists tend to focus on rather -than exclude values (Arcus, 1980) , and they tend to have an interventionist orientation (Guerney C Cuerney, feaf;. This concern with values and-$9 p^riority that is given to "r"uii.rg .ha.rge'p.o-pi familogists to seek a different kind oT knowledge thai the family sch6lars *to op".u[" from the more traditional perspectives. The d-ifference is that familogists te"d tL gte more emphasis to knowledge they c2n use to create change in familiJs, and the m?re traditional approacbes tend to emphasize an approach"that seeks to "account for variance" in populations (Jurich & Blrr, 1988) .
. . Another-way a famlloglqal perspective influences epistemologies has to do with the intrinsic, fundamental, oi basic niture of some family phe.romJna. In most of the older perspectives the family is viewed as being only a social institution. When this assumption is made, it logically follows that all Jf the'i-po.tant aspects of families are assumed -to be products of cultural or social phenomeni. These issumptions lead to epistemologies that can be described as "sociai determinism" or "cultural determinism,, beca-use they assume there. is nothing that is familial that is not determinea Uy sociat conditions.. The family realm perspective makes two assumptions that are different. It assumes that social factors _are only one of the important things that influence f"*ify processes. There are also biological, ecosystemic, nutritional, -etc., factors that are ai important as the social and cultural factois. A familogical persfective also assumes there are some familial _factors that are just as fundamEntat,^basic, or intrinsic as the the other factors that influence families.
-. Several collesgus5 who reviewed earlier drafts of this paper suggested that all of the non-cultural aspects of the.family-rearm are all biological urp"Jtr. we suggest, however, that scholars also have been identifying expeiential\Rich, l-976), devebpffinti (Falicov, _12ry) , ecosystenic (p_aolucci et il.,-tsil; Bronfinbrenner,'L979),'affective (9.o*"3 1978), gender retated .(Gilligun r9g2 Gouldner, tggg), generationat lLiai', oal; Minuchin, 1974; olson et al., t98+; , distance regtilation (Klntor and LLhr, '1975 )', Family Science Review communi-cstion (watdawick et al., L967), family paradigmatic (Rersc lglta& kinds of factors that are not completely reducible io sociil or biological tcfiif ocr are some of.the epistemological reasons scholars have been construoiagbdhi; decades primary explanations that complement the explanetisoc --L] b bGGs developed in.the older dpciglin-es, One of the things this me".. is rha rbclncc 9! familogy in the last half of the twentieth centu.y does nor ocr th L -oldcr disciplines need to "move over", or that familogy is merely duplirrt c 1}i ref ideas from the older disciplines._ The new expistmologies have aUorrca-h\ilrao rdd new ideas that add to the insights developed in the older discipliu.
While familial factors can proldg primary explanationq we rrc n rryft rhar other phenomena do not influence family processes. Cultural diffcr'l*rrJr*gcat developments, climate, nutrition, historiial events, and many arcr dt-'-c"i au influence what_happens in the family sphere. More, specificatty c*id ncs will inlluence how families live and interact with family and non-fanily-n -tr.'r Or point is merely that what happens in the family realm a15s influsac€s i*r tp b ihese other spheres in ways that are not understood when we think rhrr { d-ris Lpqtant effects originate outside F-" fuTilv, And, epistemologically TFtri oi u"rt understanding we can get of these familial effects does nor .o-c ",tciEt rla rhe explanations of them are all in the intellectual tradirions of thc oldcr rcigx 566 differently, when we think that all of the importanr expl.narion" ro gidological, economic, historical, geographis, chemical, so-iotogical antropotqt{ i._ *J -" missing more insights than we have realized.
There is one final way a family realm perspective has epistcoolqiJ irp6carions. Historically, the family realn has been identified with *o-eo's CGL rb pliuare and domestic_sphere. .Because 9f tlis connecion, much of 16s lgccnt g.s-l'.r+t fcminisl epis_temolo.gy (Belenky.et a1.,1986; Bleier, 1986; Bowles & Duclli tgci, l9lt Harding, 1986; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Jaggar, L983; Keller, 19g5; Rei.hrz & Dridnan, iii press; spender, 1981; Stanley ? wTe, 1"983; whitbeck, 19g3b) .bo -grn '* to ih" epistemologies we use in studying the family realn.
These are neither minor nor irrelevant epistemological dilfcrelrrr. Tbcy do not seem to us to be what Kuhn (1970) w9g!d calla paradigmaric shift, cca thou;h some of them are part of some_ larger shifts in tha acad-emic cornmgtiy that--;
;i paradigmatic proportions.. These d-evelop_ments do signal, howevEr, rhc 6crgcacc of a new discipline that is a primary o_r basicheld. Thus far the emcrgiag 6cb b-still small yh3n w9 compare the numher of new concepts and theories tlat-h; bcco ds/€l,otJ in it to the number of ideas that have been d&eloped in the older.ri.ddi; H.;J;; it has only been arouqd for a few decades, and ii has the potenrial ri a.*t f ";;Gd primary explanations that eventually it may become a maj6r primary dirdplitrc.
oIn summary, the main point in this section is that when we stott vith a fatnilial perspective, contpared to the nnny otlrcr ffictive and trclpful penpectiws ha qist in tlrc a9.Ldemic comntunity, we s-ee things differentty. we ali ainerint ryclriants, locus ort dffirent parts of reality, and construct ideas that are different."
. .Tl"tP ulre many reasons the older social sciences developcd penpectives that were relatively insensitive to the unique aspects of the family r."t-.'Some of t-he reasons are that the dominant ideologies and p-erspectives i-o the academic 6666rnigy when the older social sciences emerged emphaiized the rational aspects of huma. individualistic orientation, focused primarily on public rather than private areas of the !*|n experience, and centered on the hedonistic aspects of humans. Also, they were dominated by a male-orientedNewtonian/Cartsian view of the world (Capr a,' tSSi1, ini this led to mechanical, atomistic, economic, and political rather than^domestic'and nurturing views of social phenomena. The result is that the older social sciences tended to become pub lic'sphere disciplines rather than family-sphere disciplines. fney assu-eJ !hg! 1!" p_roblematic and salient parts of the human-eiperience are in the "o-.""r.iuf, indMdualistic, political,.economic, military, legal, and educational realm5--ns1 the family realm. This led scholars in these fields _to-develop questions, theories, .o"."pt( method-ologies, and explanations that rectified the doctrine of separate spheres and largely ignored the unique characteristics of the family realrn.
It seems to us that cultural anthropology started out with the most sensitiviry to the uniqueness of the f-{y rgalm. Unfort"nately, however, ethnographers uod anthropological theorists inherited enough of the dominant infeilectual traditions in Western thought that the individualistic, hedonistic, rational, monochronic, and controlling themes d-ogpa!.ed the emerging explanations.
Therefore, .rirtu.J anthropology, as its label indicates, developEd -more cultural explanations rather than familial explanations.
. 9o*9 parts of sociology also came close to developing a familial perspective. If gocjology had become a.study-of "socio'' phenomena in the bioadest sense it ;ight tave included the entire foTily realm, but the problematic and explanaiory phenom"ena, thi explicandum and explicans, on which iociology tends to focus'aie public-realm phenomena such as class, status, p_ower, and sociii change. The sociology ir tn" ru*1y is an important area in.the family field, but it has a public--realm, sociologllal orieotatioi rath.er thall a perspective that grew from attention to the unique characteristics of the familyrealm. Certai"ly, it continues to make an important condibution in understandins the public aspects and connections of families, but these insight, "i" qrii" ;tf6;;;t f;"; the ideas developed by the more familial perspectives.
Several of the other social sciences did not even come close to having a familyreaLn perspective. Economists, for example, have traditionatty asiu*ed that h'umans aie rational and motivated by a desire to maximize gain, and this i. i""o*patible with the :::,":.: lllhe fSmil{ t"ul.to. The economic pers-pective can be used to^study th;;;;; ratlo.nal ,and gain-sliented aspects of the family re?lm, but it does not fit with most family phenomena.
The idea of self intere,st is a central principle in political science. Thus, political theory focuses on a controiling rather than deveiop-"otul ,i "rrt*i"g qd;fh;;; relationship. These ideas are-inherently different ir-om the f"-iii;""t", ^a"a trr"y a." probably the reason thalthe family wai almost totally igooteJi;pouti.i irr"o.y *iil rggently (Abbott, 198L, Diamond, r"9g3; Eisenstein, is5+; etrhtai.n, 19g1; Grimshaw, 1986; Morgan, 1985; Nicholson, L986) .
Most of the dominant-concerns in psychology also are not family-oriented. For example,.intelligence is defined and operitio"&"1u.
uo uptituJ" ro. a"uil"g *iih public-sphere phenomena rather than the more familial ph""-;';;; such as o*iurio!, care, amity, and bonds. Another evample is the extensive array of .oo."pts in the studv of personaliry because most of these constructs tend to deal *im p"uriffih*;;;;; of the human condition. Some psychologists continue t.
"-uiu."'u ru-iry p".rp"'.ii* with regard to interadion, T9 rd*9u".t-up*itn rheir current ,"r"-.n, uoi tiir fpp*., to be a small proportion of the field and fiirlv recenr. Family Science Review t97
An additional reason that none of the older disciplines evolved into a family-realm discipline is that they emerged in a historical era when individualism w35 alm651 unquestioned. They therefore tended to emphasize the individualiq,tic aspects of the human condition, and when connections were considered they r,r7s1s almq5[ always public spheres of the state, city, or commercial arenas that were examined. The domestic sphere was not viewed as problematic inasmuch as it was defined as women's place, men's haven, and the locale of the family in the private sphcre (Cott, 1977; Degler, 1980; Leach, L980; Ryan, 1981; Smith-Rosenberg, 1985; Welter, 1966) . The private domain was not viewed as a helpf-ul explanatory sphere until fairly recently when it became a major focus of family therapeutic and feminist scholarship.
Thus, the established social science disciplines have discovcred many ideas about family phenomena, but the knowledge tends to be about t\e public-reolm parts of the famiiy rather than the family-realm pafis. Such knowledge is valuable in understanding the aspects of the family realm that are part of the public spheres and the parts that interact with the public spheres. Much of the essence of the family realm, however, has not been included in the intellectual nets of the earlier disciplines.
Another reason fanilogy did not develop earlier was that there was not enough interest until recently" Davis indicated that the reason he eventually gave up in trying to create the field in the 1.930's was because..." nobody seemed interested. I did write several articles on what I considered to be fundamental aspects of the family field as I conceived it, and I even at that time (around L938) advocated a separate journal on marriage and the family, but I was discouraged by lack of interest. (Davis, 19&f, Scholars have been aware for millennia that our economic systems have been fraught with difficulty, and they were aware that political systems have been chaotic. They also have been aware that many people were mentally troubled and social conditions could be improved. These problematic conditions led, respectivelv, to economics, political science, and psychology, and sociology. The familv, however, was not generally perceived as problematic until after the industrial revolution, and it was not apparent that we needed to think about family phenomena in a new way unril well into the twentieth century. The result was that the family area did not even start to emerge as an area of inquiry in the early part of this century, and then it began as an interdisciplinary area.
A few scholars, such as Kingsley Davis and Ernest Groves, started seeking a primary family field in the 30s and 40s, but the intellectual commu'rity was not ready. Groves observed in the 19zl0s that we needed a "science of marriage and the family," and he recognized that it would have a different "point of view." He also realized that it would emerge only after a group of "pioneers" laid the groundwork. His comments, almost a half century before their time are illuminating:
The establishment of a definite program for the training of specialists in the field of marriage and the family means that several sciences must contribute to the instruction. The outcome will be a science of marriage and the family carried out by specialists who will draw their data from a wide range of resources. They will not be sociologists, home economists, or social workers, but persons who are committed to the gathering and the giving of information that concerns marriage and the family, who have prepared themselves for such an undertaking, and have approaclrcd tlrcir task front a bockground slnred by no otlw science . . . The two things needful are recognition that the time has come to do this, and the commitment of able men and women to the task. The development of graduate prog-ams ef [aining should go hand in hand with the e-e.-ge.t.e of the science of marriage and the family. Although the pioneers in the building of this science necessarily must be persons who have-been trained in some other specialty, any exaggeration of the value of the material that falls within any one of the older specialties can be avoided if those giving graduate instruction fairly represent a wide range of the scientific investigations of concern to marriage. (Groves, 1946, p.2i.Italics added.) A final reason we believe the family field did not emerge until recently is that scholars did not reahze the limitations of the existing disciplines. The feminist literature and the new scholarship on women has been enormously helpful in this area because it has helped us realize the limitations of the traditionai, male-oriented view that has dominated all of science. This helped us become aware that additional points of view are feasible, desirable, and necessary.
AREAS IN THE FAMILY FIELD TI{AT HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING PRIMARY FAMILIAL EXPI-ANATIONS -
In our evolving view ofwhat has happened in recent decades, we believe there are at least four areas of inquiry that have foidecades been construcfine what we consider to be a.frylogr.g perspective because their attention to "family-real*" phenomna created insights that were not developed with other perspectives. The four are the familogically oriented parts of family therapf, child^ development and family relationships., the home rna:ragement part of home economics, and the family-orientei parts of feminist theory. The first three of these areas emerged as deliberati attempts to focus o1 {amily phenomena, but the-insights created in ihe feminist area *"r" byproducts of the feminist critique of the family.
Family Therapy
F3PtJy therapy began as an area of academic inquiry when a number of therapists such as Nathan Ackerman (1958) and Don D. Jackson (1957) becrr'e dissatisfied with the therapies they had learngd. in-.psychiatry and began to fook for famiiial explanations. One of the reasons for their dissatisfaction was tlat the psychiatric therapies thet ha; been using focused on treating individuals rather than famili'es. Some of these ther'apies lSngled the {amily factors so much that they "actually proscribed therapist contact foth family members" (Bavelas & Segal, L982, i.gg).
These clinicians started their search with some clinical inpressions that the family was important in the etiology and treatment of mental illnisses, but they hua "6 systematic_ theory, no research, no set of assumptions, and no academic tridition or intellectual foundation to guide them. They *et-e a group of revolutionaries who had little more than a vague awareness of several pe.rpeciiuesihat they did not want to use as their intellectual foundation. For examplel they knew they did not want to use the individual orientations that had dominated-psychiatry and psyclology. Fortunately. their clinical inferences were enough to launcfi ihem in a oi* direciion that has b;";;; fruitful and exciting.
In the four decades :y." lu-ry therapy began, it has deveroped an impressive number of explanations of how families opeiite, [ow pathologies dLvelop in families, Family Science Review   r93 and what is needed to avoid and correct pathological family conditions. Tbc theorists did not have the benefit of the philosophical rationale thar is provided by Davis' (1984) idea about the connections created by the birth process. They also did nor have the benefit of the conceptual model that demonstratei how these connectioos male up the f.u*ilv reakn 19s7) . And, the theories that were *"ri oot developed by philosopher-theorists. They were created by soldiers in tbc'treaches who were trying to understand why some therapeutic worked and some &l oot cork. Lidz's model on coalitions, There are many exanples of prinar.v fanilial explanations in the faqlly therapy lijerature. An oldei exampie is a priicipb dorloped by Theodore Lidz (1963) and his colleagues in their sioaies 'of ni fanilies'of schizophrenic chil&en" Lidz and his colleagues were some of thc firsr scbolars to break with the older-psychiatric perspectives and look for familial erptanar;oos of mental illnesses. The heart of Li&'s ideas about coalitions are that... children receive their primary trnining in group living wirhi! thc family, remaining dependent -upon the parents foi many years, raning inrenie emotional bonds to them, and developing through-assimilarin -hom the parents and introjection of their characteristics, and yet mu51 so lcarn to live ytry the-family in a way that will enable them to emerge &m ir and srarr families of their own as members of the parental generaiooThe parents serve_as.guides, educators, and models for offspring They provide nurturance and give of themselves so that the children ia" ie"etoi. Thgugb individuals, as parents they function as a coalirion, dividiDg roles and tasks in which they support one another. The parents are propcrly-depeudent upon one another, and the children must be dependenr urm iare-nts, uut parents should not be dependent upon immature-childreo-_ -P-*"l!l can, oj course, form a reasonably satisfactory coalitioo in respect to their children despite marital disharmony, to some erstrt crEn aespite separation. They can maintain agreement about how the childlcn should be raised. They can even support their spouses to the chil&en as c,northwhile persons and good parents, as when a mother tells a child that her husband is I good father and a fine man whom she has loved, but that their wayrs and ideas differ.
. . .In the high-schismatic marriages of parents of schizophrenic patients which we studied,.the marriages weie not ii*ply unhappy ti" ,po*o *.r" hostilely-depreciative of one" another, rivalrous-for u .nit4 considlring lovalty to the.other parent as rejection, and making it clear that growing up tJ ue tit. the other qqen! would be unacceptable. The pseudo.oilitioo rhat existed in the skewed families in which one parent abdicited the parental role--usuallv the husband who was but an adjunit to a disturbed but d^ominant ,rif"-.t"ut.a serious role imbalances and promoted unhealthy dyad formation between mother and son. (Lidz, L963, p.56) .
Thus, the priqciple these scholars developed is that there are several boundaries bef.wee-n parent and child generations that are natural and desirable; and when families maintain these boundaries it contributes to the healthy development of the members of the f.amily. Conversely, when these boundaries become blurred it interferes *iill""rtiy development. This explanation of one factor that makes a difference in the healthy development of humans is a helpful example of a primary familogical explanation because it was neither developed nor reducible to a psychological, sociological, historical, economic, or historical perspective. It was developed by appealing to familial phenomena, generational differences and boundaries, for the explanation.
The construction of reality in families. The work of David Reiss and his colleagues (1981) on the ways families construct reality is a more recent example of primary familial explanations that are being developed by family therapists. In the introduction to the book, he states that the purpose of their work was to discover how the family... through the course of its own development, fashions fundamental and enduring assumptions about the world in which it lives. The assumptions are shared by all family members... Indeed, the core of an individual's membership in his own family is acceptance of, belief in, and creative elaboration of these abiding assumptions. When a member distances himself from these assumptions, when he c:rn see no further possibilify for creatively elaborating them, he is diluting his own membership and begins the process of alienation from his family. (Reiss, 1981, Preface.) The idea that families fashion and construct their own realiry is a novel insight, and dramatically different from the view of family that dominates in the older disciplines. The "traditional perspective...sees the family as a passive receptacle of influence from the wider social context in which it lives" (Reiss, 1981, p.4) . The Reiss approach to family process assigns the creativiry to the family itself as an active, dynamic force molding and shaping its world as it attempts to survive.
Reiss' model also helps us understand that the process of constructing assumptions is primarily covert. As the family constructs it's realify, the process is private attd noorational. -It's goals are complex, and many times obscure. when expos-d to the light of the non-family world, the patterns and subtle nuances carefully and quickly retreaifrom view. Instead, a front stage presentation is arranged and acted out for those present. Oniy when the coast is clear do the patterns reemerge and resurface. Reiss also suggests a rather innovative definition of the family which focuses on membership ratheiihan social structure. He states that membership in the family is a function of tlie acceptance or willingness of the family to participate in the constructed reality. This is a unique processual approach quite different from macro level constructions focusing on structure.
The methods used by the Reiss team contributed to their ability to focus on and develop ideas consistent with the uniqueness of the family realrn. They relied heavily on observations of families and attempted to build from the "ground up", beginning with the observations of family phenomena which would lead to explanations.-Mosl current theories of the family have operated in the exact reverse. Ai Reiss observes that: most current theorizing about the family... comes upward from the psychology of the individual: psychoanalysis, stimulus-response theory, and symboiit interactionism. Some of it -for example, exchange theory and role iheorycomes laterally from social psychology. And still more comes downward from anthropology, sociology, economics, and political theory. (Reiss, 1981, p.4.) There are many other examples of primary explanations that could be identified in the family therapy literature, but space precludes their description. They use creative concepts such-as: punctuation flMatzlawick et aJ.,1967), differentiation (Bowen, 1978) , distance regulation (Kantor & Lehr, 1975) , hierarchy (Minuchin, , regimes Family Science Review (Constantine, L986) , and levels of control in systems (Broderick and Smith, 1979; Watzlawick et al., L974) .
Cltild Developntent and Family Relations
A large number of CDFR3 departments were organized in the middle decades of the twentieth century. Love identified over fifty of them that had graduate programs in 1,981 (Love, 1982) . These departments had a different perspective than the older, more traditional social science fields. They were more interested in values, affectional relationships, optimal development, and strategies for helping people attain 1[sir family goals. The ideas that have been developed in this area reflect such emphases.
The combination of child development and family relations in these departments was not an accident. It was a deliberate strategy because a number of the individuals who influenced the design of the programs were committed to studying the development of children in a family context rather than as isolated individuals. For example, the efforts of Cora Bussey Hillis in getting resources for the child development institute at Iowa State University and the efforts of Lawrence K. Frank in overseeing the distribution of grants to promote the study of child development were attempts to study child development in a family context (Irwin & Bushnell, 1980; Sears, 1975) . Some child development programs since have become so dominated by developmental psychologists that they have lost a familial perspective, but most of them are still sensitive to the central role of the family in human development.
Even though the intellectual traditions that developed in the CDFR departments were relatively unique, the scholars in these departments did not explicate the philosophical basis of 16sir uniqueness. Their differences were appiuent to themselves and to related disciplines such as psychology and sociology, and frequently these differences were viewed suspiciously. For example, a sizeable number of scholars in the older disciplines viewed the CDFR area as being more soft or inept intellectually. Some thought that it did not have the empirical or methodological rigor it should have. At the same time, many of the scholars in the CDFR departments viewed the older disciplines as irrelevant because they focused on phenomena that had little value in creating change in families. We believe that the basis for these differences can now be identified moie clearly, and both groups can be appreciated, understood, and utilized (Jurich & Burr, 1988) . The key to understanding the differences is to recognize the difference between the family-realm perspective in the CDFR area and the more public-realm perspectives that were the dominant approach in the older areas.
Hess and Handel's model. Robert Hess and Gerald Handel (1959) developed a number of primary familial explanations while they were in the human development program at the Universiry of chicago. They viewed the family as a unique fype of psychosocial organizali61, and they developed innovative concepts to help us understand how families strive to achieve a satisfactory pattern of separateness and connectedness; how they d.evelop and manage images; how they test, explore, and aflrm the images to create family themes; and how they establish and manage boundaries.
Hess and Handel helped us become aware that the images family members have of each other and of their family are influential and also quite different from non-family images. They state that the "the intimate and constant exchange that characterizes the nuclear family makes" an.... August. 19 are possible for him. It says something about him as a person. But it is also a cast into the future, providing the holder with directibn in relatine to and i"te-racting with the obj99t. while it represents the holder,s needs and,wishes, it also represents the object as a source of fulfillment ... (and) it draws from gultural values, role expectations, and the residue of the parents, experiences in their families of origin. (Hess & Handel, 1967, p. 14) According to Hess and Handel, families create central concerns or themes. A family theme is defined as a shared posltio,n the family adopts in relationship to the outer world, the non-family realms. "A family theme is a paitern of feelings, motives, fantasies, and conventi6qalizsd understandings grouped abbut some locus -of .o.r""rni (1959' P-'18) . Usually these loci of concern reflect the complex nature of the personalities of the individuals in the laTily but only exist in the collective r"p."r"oi"d by the family. SaTPle _themes may include'issues of security, strength in timei "i..irii dependabiliry, and religiosity. It is from these themei'that 'iife's directives a.e established. They provid.e the logic o-f *hy families do certain things and why they do not do others. Additionally, they regulate the delicate nature of inteiaction beiween the family and non-family realms.
,
Olson's gen.erational ties model. The work of Terry Olson (1984) and his colleagues rs a more recent example 9f Pli*u.y familogical explanations deveioped in the CdfR atea. TheA work is a helpful example beiause ii also illustrates th" hu..oorry uod inteldependence of theory research, ind application that is being seen increasirlfyl. the field. ,_ ,_Th,"-Olson program began as an attempt to improve the effectiveness of programs l:_ttry"d to decrease premature teenage pregnancy. They observed that attempts to deal wrth teenag€ pregnancy from biological, legal and sociological approaches were not meeting with much succesq and they deliberitely decided to ipprou"n the problem from a familial point of view. They also observed tlat several characteristi.r'"r irt" i"-1y realm have important consequences for decision making about iexuat behavior and pregnancy. For example., the. process of giving birth is n6t an isolated event that only involves the mother and child. It is a p-t-of a complex *"U of connections thai unavoidably in9l9{e sevelal generations. ihe child that i teenage mother gives Uirth ; creates a grandchild for the teen's parents, and this means the clonnectionJbe&een the teen and the grandparents are involved.
These scholars also reasoned that the process of giving birth to a child influences the affectional, mental, emotional, occupational, educition"al, nurturing, ,".p;;;ibilitt aspects of the teen's tr?^t" -11y and complicated ways. elio, many t*eens iave little understanding of these-effects. However, il teens did unierstand'these connections, their insights *oll_q-probably influence the decisions they make about-sexuat behavior and pregnancy. When teens are unaware of the effects oi the birth process, they would tenJ to make decisions that would.lead to-consequences they would not prefer." Thus, their decisions about sexual behavior would tend' to be less'infoir""a, f"* moral, and less wise. On the other hand, if teens were to become aware of the familial connections that are interrwined with their sexual behavior and pregnancy, their insights would lead them to decision making that would lead to *o." d"rtuble'consequeies. This ,"il;t"; therefore provides familogical explanations of teenage d;ii;; making, u"J ah; explanations are not reducible to economic, psychologicll, o. ,o.iological eiilanations.
.|f 19ace allowed, many other examples from the CDFR area could be identified. David. o.lson's (olson €t_a1., r-983) :fu.."*pl."l model, ror "*u-pi", was deveroped by selectively using ideas that had been dealt with in the oider dir.ii[t;r, but ir has be.o*6 Family Science Review I97 a familogical model because he and his colleagues modified the ideas and extended it in ways that are consistent with the characteristics of the family realm. It is likely that the model would have developed in different ways if he and his colleagues had not had a family perspective. Other examples include Vogel and Bell's (1960) scapegoating theory, the additions McCubbin and his colleagues (1982) made with the coping dimensions to the family stress literature, the use of developmental tasks (Duvall & Miller, 1985) , and the work on the role of support in the family (Rollins & Thomaso 19?9) .
Resource Management
Resource management, the oldest of the four areas that harrc developed theories with a family-reel-perspective, had its intellectual roots in home economicq and it has evolved through four eras (Vickers, 1984) . Era one occurred during the first quarter of the century when great strides were being realized in public healtb-Dudng this lrsl period, the management literature emphasi2sd xtteining prcscripti'rc staadards in sanilslisn and hygiene (Richards, 1910) .
Era two occurred during the years around word war II when tbcre was a growing awareness of the benefits of powered appliances and plannsd ph)6tcal facilities in the home; e.g. the appropriate location of doors and cupboardc and thc hcigbt of counter and table tops. The management literature during this period fooscd oo how these physical facilities could be combined with the efficient s5s sf furrrnan timc and energ,v to bring about task simplification (Bratton, 1959; Gross & Everett, lg15; Heiner & McCullough, 1947; Steidl, 1955) .
Components of management were emphasized during thc third cra of the 1950's and L960's. During this period concepts such as family, rral'.es, goa\ standards, resources, decision making, organization, and process were derrcbpcd aod refrned. The progression of thought concerning these concepts can be traccd in fbc tcr books and subsequent editions of Gross and Crandall (19af and Niclcll and Dorsey (1942) . During this era there was a gradual shift away from an e€ooooic pcrspcctive that emphasized work performance in the home. A more famil;r rcalo pcrspcaitc emerged with a focus on the development of the individuals living in rhc hmc (Victcrs, 19821) .
During the fourth era of thought, the emphasis shifted to tbc darclopment of systems oriented management frameworks. The two major appm*tcs that were developed during this period were a social systems framework (Dc.m & Fuebaugh, 1975) and an ecological framswslk (Paolucci, Haq & Axi!4 19?7). Borh of these approaches moved the literature to more of a family leelm pcrspcclirc. At obecrved by Vickers (1984) , these systems theories provided a frames611 that bclpcd c@oeptualize the multiple bonds a-ong family members and the multidireaioual in8aoccs of home management, technology, and larger economic, political phFrcal and socio-cultural systems.
9t" of the important contributions of the resource managenenr modcls is thar they both have indeterministic views of individuals and families. Thelr focus oo thc purposive, teleological parts of family processes where choices are at leasi somewhar frci. fnis ii important because most of the other systems models in the family 6cld have been basically deterministic, even when the scholars have tried to avoid a causal or deterministic approach.
Demands. The concept of demands is one of the management coocspts thar has a family-realm orientation and is useful in primary explanations. Deacon and Fuebaugh (L975) , for example, view the family as a system with personal and -""rgerial subsystems, and two oJ the important system inputs are resources and demands. Aithough the concept of resources is widely used in i number of disciplines, th;;;;."pt of demands is not. Conventional micro economic theory posits that cnoices in the familv are made in consideration of -maximizing behavior which is subject to i""o^" ^ I resource' ^exogenously determined market prices (including wages) and production technologies, and stable preferences (Becker iozo;. io*"u"rli., G fo;";;;A;;;; systems models, "demands" is used as a concept to more adequately r"rog"ir;io.""i internal and external to the family that go beyond market .oioitioi. ;"d"p;;t"" technologies.
Internal demands include the effects of goals and values that originate from within the. family and circu'nstances that result-from the f"-iti".
iimediate shu.eJ environment. The shared environment may include the surrourrai"g uuing-ilif avrilable objects, and the.biological systems including plants, animals, -u"a aEirla*i lamily members. The.family also is bombarded consta"ntiy *iti e*t".out demands in the form. of requests, requirements, and expectations from the'macro-environme"t. Tt"i, ;; regulations for school attendance, {tiui"g on.public ro.ads,_zoning o.dioances, ana;"f;i requirements. Their are also socio-culiural^ normative demanZs or expectations that serve as a demaad input.to the family syslem- (Deacon & Firebaugb, ^197t . M;t demands ar.e exp-erienged by most families'of a given type, while ottr"r. are particular to I q::.1-f]"ity. fl" polychronic nature of "demids" i" in" ho*e *aoag"ment lirerarure rs entrely consistent with a family renlm view.
standards. Standards is a second home management concept that has been developed with a fanity re.alg p-e1spg9tive. standarts ; qr"liry andf or 4ilt,, measures that exist in the minds of family members as a result of attempts to reconcile resources with demands. In meeting g94-. qtd events, and in ri"i"g *iih iil" circumstances of reality, standards are eitu-blished in the m-inar oiru-ity -J-ur., uJ shared between them.to help bring the family system i"to "q"ifit.iuo. some degree of balance. Famfis5 have tfieir oin unique Lray of standar'd", ,;;" "f ,*a;;i;; flexible and situation defined, while otheis -u{ p" relatively i"h"-iUr". st*a".a, i""v defrne. the parameters of interpersonal relationshipr ur *"riu'. G"-uilorutioo of resources to a given type of activity.
The concept of stardards and standard setting explains salient aspects of expectations, the setting of lirnits, planning, implementatToo, '-Ja".irio" -utir!.-1t i. a useful concept that courd be usei l" gtJrt q-d*otug" tt;th.;;"nd pracririoners in other family realm a'eas. of study such is famr]r r"tut"ioo-.'-Ji;;ily rt "iufy. ih;il; of standards ag.explained here, was deveroped uy o"u"L" uiJrirlui"gh gbisl i;; ;;t that is not unlike the development of 'o-y oth", fanily ,ealr,, .oo."p,.. They found that the. idea of prescriptive standards permeated trc rtonie iu"ujeient literature. yet, this did not fir with there experience and observations of f?miues, ;J ;i;y i;i; prescriptive standards we.e not yery useful to fa-ilies ar-in"y *"." Iikely to have different standards from one anothei.
Grants. A third family resource management example is taken from family economics which is closely allied with the home. managemJnt/resource management literature. with his talent for yaking nonconventio"ul o"ur"ruuiio.,r, rroo"tn Boulding (1972) introduced the idea of the "grints economy.,' rh" .oo."pi, t J*"u"., is so foreisn to the main concerns in economics that it has been seen as rirtG -"i" iff:; interesting idea, but Bivens (1976) recogntzea tnat i;;; ;i;;ti .lah perrp"crive, ir is a useful idea. Family Science Review r99 Grants are one-way transfers in which one person gives resources to another without a contractual agreement, formal expectation or usually even an informal expectation that the favor will be returned. Grants involve the one-way transfer of a broad range of both concrete and abstract resources. Even though grants and exchange often look a lot alike, their underlying motivations are different. In exchange you give me something, if and only if, I give you something deemed to be of equal value. In grants, I give you something out of the sheer goodness of my heart and you may or may not return the favor.
Bivens (L976) recognized the family to be an important granting organization in society, and he described how grants contribute to the integrative family structure, to its' effective functioning and to the central role of the family in the successful and efficient functioning of the market economy. He estimated that grants inside the family accounted for more than 75 percent of the 500 billion dollars annual value of grants made in the United States. The integrative function of grants in the family is manifest in the way they accomplish more than the distribution of resources and contribute to intimacy, closeness, commitment, bonds, nurturing and a willingness to sacrifice, serve and nurture in the family realm. Bivens (1976) expressed concern that these side benefits may be lost as families move away from the use of grants to the more extensive use of exchange and monetization which is typical with industrialization.
Bivens (L976) suggests that the extensive use of grants in the family realm is essential in developing a wide range of abilities that are essential for the pubiic-realms to operate. For example, the grants economy in families develops the abiliry to trust others enough to be willing to operate an exchange-oriented market economy. They also help in developing minimai levels of conformiry in the myriad of otherwise unenforceable social conventions. These primary familial explanations provide new insights into ways the family makes essential contributions to the processes that occur in the public realms.
There are other examples which could have been used from the family resource management literature dealing with such things as resources (Rowland, Dodder & Nickols, 1985; Hogan & Buehler, 1.983; Foa, 1971") and activiry in the home (Beutler, Owen & Hefferan, L988) .
Feminist Theory
Not unlike other scholarly areas where multiple theories co-exist u-oder the general rubric of "theory" feminist theory is also a general term that refers to the pluralism of conceptual frameworks that are concerned with improving the position of women in our contemporary and future society.
Feminist frameworks are systems of ideas, conceptual structures that fe minists can use in explaining, justifying, and guiding their actions. Typically, a feminist framework is a comprehensive analysis of the nature and causes of women's oppression and a correlated set of proposals for ending it. It is an integrated theory of women's place both in contemporary society and in the new society that feminists are struggling to build. (Jaggar & Rothenberg, 198.1, p. xii) Most topologies of feminist frameworks or theories include liberal, Marxist, socialist, and radical feminist perspectives as well as a more recent perspective that attempts to represent women of color. Each perspective articulates reasons why changes need to be made and asks a set of questions about what those changes need to be and who such changes will effect and how. Feminism questions methods of analyses, categories' stereot)?es, critical variables, divisions between spheres, reaLns, and domains as well as the social construction of biological sex and g"oder.
For example, to the extent that the family has been considered a part of the private :ph:,t"" and women's place, feminists question, often by deconstructio"', tir" pru"" ii;trr" tamtl/' tn the oppression of women in society. Feminism confronts the cbntradiction :l{j:::i.:
-o.," glaring.each day thar whiie the idealized traditional ,ra*ri;;it locates women olly T the home and.family realm where the father is virtually absent, her experience of reality finds.hertaking care of the home and family in aAaiti6n to frei also needing to be in the marketplace in order to take care of or provide for her home and family. Feminists.question any_non-critical analysis of the fimily thu; ;;g;, ;i;; w9Tel an{ f${v to the. private sphere and ignores'gender as a separate catelory of critical analysis that is subsequently kept invisi6le and"unanalyzed.
Most feminists are concerned with questiorrs about the presence of sexual politics h !!: f.u{ily and the state. To uncover suih politics, the bounfaries and language of the public/priva!" _-d _political/personal musi be deconstructed-The firnd"amental assumption is that the relations of the family.are political but that i. i"tp;;;.il; Hence the focus of feminists on demystifying the hierarchical nature ^of ^social relationships in the family.
.tn this way it becomei possible to explore tn" ."taiioor*f, between childbearing and lactation and childcarin! and .nilai"'uii"g p.u"ti"".-i" oii society.
One of the immediate consequences of drawing on alternative frameworks for analyzrng women's condition is thit alrnost every a-spect of women's lifle becomes problematic. A central questioa in this regard is whether or not women's experience of :::tv*ttl{: is^categorically and qualitative-iy different rhan men's experience i,r "u"ryauy lrte' I hat rs' ts human nature dualistic? Is there a female essence and a male "s"o"" or just furrrnsl essence? This is a crirical issue in feminist .;irlil;, of ri" i;ilt.
t; analyses of the family by feminists capitalize on rhe culturj diffe.eoces ttrai exisi between women and men at the experrse of the similarities? UsefU ou-pf", of1ni. problematic that are also represeniative of feminist contributions to a family realm perspective are discussed below. Unlike family therapy, child A"u-top."ol *i r"-lfy relations, and resource m_anagement, feministiritique "i'tn"]"-ify was not developed with the overt intent :,f &:*l.irg familoei.car-expianationr. N;i. it u" "*u-pi"-Jiu familial perspe-ctive. Yet, this iteiatu.e is-in faci u"ry-i"ro.-uiiu" uoa helpful to our construction of the familogical perspective.
Bemard's two maniages--his and hers. In the early 1970s, Jessie Bernard (who was a feminist long before the emergence of the women's movement in the 1960s) p.oau."J a number.of important discussions (e.g., L972, Lg74, rg7s) uuoui-a.riag", -irin".rro"a, and families based on the premise tLaI women experienced the insiitutions of marriase. motherhood, and the faqily in ways different from men-Th[;;;;;;;^;;; ftj very different rhings as wives and/or morhers rhan did husbanJs ";:/;; f;";. td;; analyses and inrerpretations argued rhat in any given *".;i&;;ih;i" *"r" rwo differenr sets of percertions, feejings,views, and interpreiations abouitiat marriag"--orr" ro. tne husband and one for the wife. Bernard (1975 Bernard ( , 1981 maintained that as a society, we had institutionarized fatherhood by casting fathers i" the ',good-provider .ot".l,-"Si-itui[, motherhood had been insriturionalizsd by casting *olhe* L the role of il;;;t'" rr," .*"rii"g institutionalized familv, as well ai the institutions of fatherhood and motherhood, were all products of affluence and a privileg"J *t it" middle class view of the world.
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Famiiy Science Review Bernard's arguments have never been taken seriously by most professionals in the field. Bernard's work, spanning several decades, is a useful example, in similar ways to the experience of Kingsley Davis, of how disciplines respond ia disinterested and discouraging ways when confronted with new directions or definitions that are at odds with accepted ways of thinking and knowing. Her major premise has bcen added to considerably through the feminist conceptualizations that have beeu advanced and articulated since then.
Motlrcrhood as experience and institution. A few years after Bernard's initial discussion about his and her marriages, Adrienne Rich wrote an importanr book (19'/6) entitled Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institutioo-Rich's book wai one of many discussions about motherhood to be written during the noc decade (Arcana, 1979; Chodorow, 1978; Dinnerstein, 1976; Eisenstein. 1983 : Ferguson, 1983 Fla4 1978; Lazarre, L976; Rossi, 1977; Sokolofl 1980; Trebilcor, 1983) rbar grappled with a wide range of issues and relationships, across a host of disciplines, rhat placed morhers at their center. But Rich's analysis was particularly timely and poigrrant because of the unique differentiations and examinations she made between the man-made institution of motherhood and women's experience of motherhood. At a time when male childrearing experts were higbiy visible, Rich called for bold and courageous mothering as women's united response to the institutionalized, sacrificial 'mothcrlove' that men demanded"
Whenwe think of the institution of motherhood no slmbolic architecture comes to mind no visible embodiment of authority, power, or of potcnrial and actual violence....we do not think of the laws which determioc bos ne qor to these places, the penalties imposed on those of us who harc tricd ro lii ou. Iives according to a different plan, the art which depicts us in an rrnneturd serenity or resignation, the medical establishment which has robbed so rnanv women of the act of giving birth, the €xp€rts--almost all Eal,e-c/ho have told us how, as mothers, we should behave and feel. We do no( rhinlr of the Marxist intellectuals arguing as to whether we produce'surplus naluc' in a day of washing clothes, cooking food, and caring for children, oitlc psploa"atysti who are certain that the work of motherhood suits us bv natue. wc do not think of the power stolen from us and the power withheld from us ia gg name of the institution of motherhood....women [must] never again forget rhrl sg1 many fragments of lived experience belong to a whole wuio is not of our creation. (Rich, 1976, pp. 274-275, 276) The institution of motherhood idealizes "motherwork' (Beroar4 197{) as being natural, biologiml, blessed, and instrumental to the perpetuation and prcscrration oT human activities and the huma'r race. Through this idsaii"alis4 thc onloing; everyday acts women perform are perceived, atalyzed, and articulated differenrli rhi they are experieaced by women.
The needs (which are presumed and nevcr criticalv analrzed) of children and men, to be met.by women as mothers, are refied as demanding ru1 *a undivided attention if men, children, and families are to survive. women's ieeds are assumed to be met by motherhood. Augusr. l, are assumed to have the right to sexual services without consequences or reproductive responsibiliry, the right to have children without childcaring and c[ildrearing responsibilities, and the right to have a concerned interested partner nurture, care for, and attend to (be mothered by) them without having to reciprocate.
Renate Bridenthal (L982), a contemporary historian, has recently commented on these incongruous perceptions of motherhood in the context of the contemporary family.
The major feminist contribution [to a critique of the family] has been to view women as individuals within the family, rather than as mere components of it or anchors to it; that is, to view women as persons involved in lamilial and nonfamilial activities, as men routinely have been perceived. From that vantage point, everything looks different. [For example], while it has been ghown repeatedly that married women take jobs either to improve their family's living standard or to keep it from falling, the interpretation persists that such work for the family is actually destroying it. This opinion is possible only if one sees women as the core of the family, rather than as one member of the family. It also suggests that only a permanent presence in the household makes family possible. (p.231)
. Contrary t9 many perceptions held about feminism in general, Rich (as a mother and radical feminist) is not asking for the end of motherhood, fatherhood, childhood, and the family. She is maintaining that these institutionalized categories of activities and roles are inaccurately constructed, by design, to be responsive to i social, political, and economic agenda that does not represent or recognize the actual experiences of mothers, fathers. and children.
What is astonishing, what can give us enormous hope and belief in a future in which the lives of women and children shall be meoded and rewoven by women's hands, is all that we have managed to salvage, of ourselves, for our children, sysa wilhin the destructiveness of the institution: the tenderness, the passion, the trust in our instincts, the evocation of a courase we did not \19* *9 owned, the detailed apprehension of another humanixistence, the full realization of the cost and precariousness of life. The mother's battle for her child--with sickness, with poverty, with war, with all the forces of exploitation and callousness that cheapen hrrmao life--needs to become a common human battle, waged in love and in the passion for survival. But for tF. Jo happen, the institution of motherhood muit be destroyed. To destroy the institution is not to abolish motherhood. It is to release lhe creation ani sustenance of life into the Si[ne realm of decision, struggle, surprise, imagination, and conscious intelligence, as any other difficult, bu'i-freely chosen work. (Rich, 1976, pp.279-?30) Ruddick's matemal thinking. Ruddick (1980 Ruddick ( , 1983 has described nurturins and other_processes of the work that mothers do as a set of practices that give risJ to a specific.wly o^f being and thinking. She calls tbis ntatenwl ttrinking. andjust like anv other kind. of thinking, maternal thinking has its own givens, ?emandi, .on"".rri injelgsls, virtues, trappings, and experiences. Ruddick explains that "a distinctive kind of thinking arises when one attempts to understand, coirtrol, and communicate the strategies and ai-s of mater_nal practice" (Ruddick, L983, p. 234). The relationship between mothers and maternal practice is not unlike the relaiionship between scientisti and the practices of science. August, i.988 Family Science Review If the mental and emotional activities of mothers are taken seriously, on their own terms and in the terms of any model of intellectual and cognitive functions, the forms sf thinking characteristic of mothering or primary caregiving are complex and demanding. Ruddick maintains that maternal thinking can be experienced by men who engage in considerable primary caregiving activities" She argues the need for both husbands and wives to be experienced practitioners of mothering, only then can they both be considered parents in a family realm orientation"
To some, such a statement concerning mothering by men may seem more hyperbole 1[sn lsalistis. But she argues that if what men do in structuring institutions and organizstions is an indication of their values as fathers, then they are oblivious to the true impact of organizations and institutions on families. Such men are oblivious to this impact because they seldom are in a position of mothering or nurturing, attending to, and caring long enougb to know how the pertinent activities within the family are compromised and jeopardized by the demanding insensitivity and structured, ends-oriented nature of the relations between institutions, organizations, and those who work in them and who are effected by them.
Ruddick argues that if men really understood caregiving, nurturing, and the mental and emotional constancy of the responsibilities for attending to others as well as themselves, then theywould revolutionize the institutional, organizational, and corporate worlds. Otherwise they continue to sustain, perpetuate and benefit from the oppressive institutions of motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood by not taking upon themselves the responsibilities to nurture, care, and attend to others. In fact, by necessity, men must become e4perienced in maternal practice if the institutions of our sociefy are to become a truly supportive social, political, economical, and psychological fabric for the family.
The major contribution of these examples is that they enable us to see aspects of family life that we have not been able to see and conceptualize in other perspectives about family phenomena. Elise Boulding (1983) has pointed out that tradilional views of rhe family that embrace the "doctrine of separate spheres" obscure much of what takes place in the everday occruences of home and family. "When men dehne family interaition processes as the womerr's domain, as they generally do, they demonstrate that they can be present in the household without learning from these processes," (p. 279).
From thjs perspective, men can be present in the family lsnlm and uot perceive accurately what is going on around them. The citical point is that men (or-for that matter, women and children) can be within the family realm and still not see and understand the family and non-family realms with a family realm orientotion. Just as Rich's analysis highlights what can be seen and underitood about motherhood by differentiating the experience of motherhood from the institution of motherhood, the feminist critique of the family informs our understanding of family phenomena by suggesting the merits 9f orr e4ploring the family in a similar way. Thit is, given the research traditions of the family that defines family as an institution, other views can be seen and explored about famiiy phenomena when we begin our inquirv in the family realm. SOME FUTURE POSSIBILITIES (Said differently: Some dreamers, dreams.)
At the current time, it is not possible to guess what the future holds for familoeical explanations and how much the family field will become a recognized primarv discipline. anticipated or articulated. It.is_ possible that it may become one of the major social science areas. It is also possible that it may be much more effective than we have reaLzed in hgJging_ us understand some of the-most serious problems that are being faced by world leaders. It also may help us much more than wi 1r3ys leatized i" fi;;i"; better strategies for managing and deaiing with these problems.
One w-ay it may become more-helpful than w-e currently think possible is that it may help us lsalize that seeing our problems from a familial point of ui"* -uy help us deal with them more effectively_than ye have been able to when we have lookei at tfiem onfy from our individualistic, hedonistic, public-realm-oriented points of view. Alro; i; expand this point_slightly more, it may be that the familial perspective, rather than'the economic and individual perspectives that prevail in most iociil science thought, wili turn out in the long run to be much more consistent with the fundamental cord-s of the lP--.1"_ experience. It may be that the familial point of view will sensitize us and hig|ligt{ to us ways to attain some of humankind's-host desired goals such u. p"u.",-u widgly shared prosperity, optimal care, nurturance for all memberiof society, ;'J1""*; each other. It also may help us more fully understand the fragile nature of 'u .-i.rg u"E nurturing society.
Faced with the immediate pressures of the last two decades of the twentieth century,-it r1 important to think about possibilities that may be more attainable if we have a {*I!9P point of view that ii wiaety accepted as an important intellectual approach. The familogical point_of view may-be of eirormous value in helping u".ol. with our current -problems such as alienation, substance abuse, violencel fact 'oi performance in the public sphere, lack of perspective, educational problems, low productivity, and absenteeism on the job. The fa;ilial point of view also may netp us appreciate and integrate artistic experience, the hnmaniiies, and literature much more effectively than we have with only the public sphere disciplines.
Th1s,.a disciplins-that has a family-realm perspective may have a very promisins future. It is possible that as scholars mine tnij intillectual ";prrr.n, ;ri i;;;tq"; perspective and epistemology, th_ey will develop insights, that wilLe comparable in vaiue in the coming decades to earlier i"sighfs iu-ch is psychoanalysis tapping i"to l[" unconscious and economics_tapping into the,effects ofihe production ani eichange of goods and services. Thus,.Iifry or seventy fiy" ygg. from'now, it may be tharfililt r*":g' familogy, or famology, or whatever it will be called, will be one of the most valuable basic perspectives from which to analyze h-uman conditions; and the insightsthai S.l*"*t,bl_ruk"lg thrs perspective will be of enormous value i" nerpi"f?a"age hrrmiul problems and attain lrrmsa potential.
. . l few colleagues who have reacted to this paper have wondered why we think it is helpful to spend so much time fussing with thesi epistemological issues. one reviewer :1tr:l:g-rh"t rhe paper belong5 p.a pryo-sgqhy journal rathJr than family journal. We Dereve there are several reasons it is helpful for family scholars to fuss with these kinds of issues. Some of our reasons are that a *o.e clear understanding of oui epistemological foundations, and a more clear awareness of the primary or baiic nature of familogy may have several immediate and beneficial results. li+ tetieve that the firrtill, realm has a much greater effect on the human condition than most people realize,'o,ri iy more of us were to realize that our fietd is a basic discipline thqt deLls Utn a profourAty impoftant part of the hum.an condiiion, it f? help ustrir n a paeriii of ururriti*itiiiiy in the next several decades. The twentieth century has been pri-arily a century Jf psychological explanations of what people believe is'important i"'tne n.r-ao ,prr"r"iUui if more jamily scholars were to better iealize the_ potenti"r oi ru*-ru"r "*ptuoitio.ri, tt " twenty lrst century-might become a century of iamilogical explanations; and in the Family Science Review FOOTNOTES 1. The NCFR Task Force on the Development of the Family Discipline deliberated for two years about the nature of the field and the name that should be used for the field. A seiies of position papers, suggestions, and debates were published_in the Task Force's Newsletter, which wai published with the NCFR Reoorts in 1984 and 1985. The dialogue included a paper by Davis (1984) in which he developed a typ-olo.gy of discip'lines. Davis difieientiaied between PrhilY: secondary, and tertery_fields' A primary discipline is one that develops griglnal explanations._ A-secondary field is one that integrates the primary explanations from several fields and develops new applicatio-ns. After tfiis typolgy was prblished, the majority of those involved in the discussions concluded thaf the family field is a secondary area, and recommended that the term family science be used as the name for the field. A minority of the group believed that enough primary explanations had been developed and potentially could be developed that a piimiry fieid was emerging within the larger secondary field. Over-the next several years, the-group who believe there is an emerging Plimary dis_cipline encountered others who shared their view (Groves, L944; Kantor & Lehr, 1975) , and they began clarifying the conceptual uniqueness (Beutler et al., 1987) in the primary net'a. fnis papei isln extension of this effort, and is an attempt to help describe_the epistemological foundations of the field. In the meantime, the terminology for the fi9ld his continued to be confusing. Fortunately, a new term was created in April, 1988 that seems to satisfy the group who are convinced that a new primary discipline had emerged within the larger secondary field. The term was fust coined by Kingsley Davis in some correspondenie with Wesley Burr, and it is familogy" Thus, in _our view, familogy is an emerging primary discipline that has developed in the last four decades within the larger secoodary-field of family science ---or as some prefer to call it family studies.
2. Some family therapists (Bogdan, 1987) view family therapy as a subset of psychotherapy. This is a psychological perspective that is relatively different from the iamilogical pLrspective developed by scholars such as Ackerman, Haley' Watdawick, Minuchin, etc. 
